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TAGS: [PGOV](#) [PREL](#) [MARR](#) [KNNP](#) [AF](#) [RS](#) [IR](#)
SUBJECT: U/S BURNS' JUNE 25 MEETING WITH FM LAVROV: SUMMIT
DELIVERABLES, DPRK, IRAN, MEPP

Classified By: Charge d'Affaires Elizabeth L. Dibble for Reason 1.4 (b)
and (d)

¶1. (C) Summary: In a June 25 meeting with U/S Burns, Russian FM Lavrov expressed confidence that key Moscow summit deliverables would be finalized. On a post-START framework agreement, Lavrov expressed concern that specifying a range of reductions would create an expectation that the lower targets would be achieved, but urged further negotiating rounds prior to the summit. Lavrov noted Medvedev's instructions to reach a compromise on the Afghanistan lethal transit agreement and said a joint statement on missile defense was achievable, while reiterating that implementation of U.S. missile defense plans in Europe would halt Russian cooperation. The Bilateral Commission could be announced, and Lavrov asked for a U.S. response to the GOR proposal to expand cooperation on UNSCR 1540, as well as clarification on presidential participation in inaugurating the Boeing joint venture on titanium. Lavrov was non-committal on Russian actions to lift meat and poultry restrictions, but promised to pursue in Moscow and also to revisit Medvedev's participation in a joint civil society event. Lavrov undertook to reinforce calls for full implementation of UNSCR 1874 with Burma, and requested further information on U.S. rules of engagement with the Kang Ram. Lavrov conceded that the images out of Iran were bad, but pushed for continued diplomatic engagement rather than sanctions, maintaining chances were still better than a year ago to reach agreement on resolving Iran's nuclear program. Lavrov conceded that holding a Moscow follow-on peace process conference to Annapolis required greater clarity on the ground. End Summary

START Follow-on

¶2. (C) In a June 25 meeting with U/S Burns on the margins of the G8 Foreign Ministerial meeting in Trieste, FM Lavrov was confident that substantial steps had been achieved to reach agreement on the primary deliverables for the July Moscow summit. U/S Burns stressed the importance of finalizing a substantial START follow-on framework agreement, emphasizing the President's priority in specifying a numerical target for reducing strategic warheads and delivery systems below those set by the Moscow Treaty. The framework statement could clarify that any final decision on numbers would be contingent upon the resolution of other issues. Lavrov explained that he had not been fully briefed on the results of the third round of negotiations in Geneva, but argued that a range of numbers inevitably would build expectations that the lower target would be achieved. If the lower target was not reached, Lavrov stressed, "we will send the wrong message" to the international community on nonproliferation objectives. Characterizing the U.S. and Russian positions as "not that far apart," Lavrov argued for a short presidential "blessing" of the negotiations, with the focus on the joint statement on nuclear security.

¶3. (C) U/S Burns reiterated the importance of a strong framework agreement, noting that a clearly specified range of

reductions would put the U.S. and Russia in a strong position to lead nonproliferation discussions at the G8 summit. Lavrov noted that President Medvedev was committed to reductions, with his recent statement urging "several times fewer" strategic delivery vehicles. Lavrov welcomed U.S.-Russian compromise language on the relationship between offensive and defensive weapons, agreement to the non-deployment of strategic systems outside national territory, as well as progress in narrowing differences over the use of conventional weapons on strategic delivery systems. He urged that the negotiating teams meet once or twice more before the Moscow summit.

Afghanistan: Lethal Transit

14. (C) Lavrov noted that Medvedev had instructed him and MinDef Serdyukov to reach agreement on the transit of lethal equipment to Afghanistan. Lavrov confirmed Russian readiness to exclude categories of weapons deliveries that would need to land for inspection, with document formalities undertaken by Russian officials at the point of embarkation. Lavrov stressed that Russia was prepared to a "make a contribution" by paying the costs of overflight and navigation fees, but was sensitive to the need that the Russian government did not undermine private sector companies, such as Volga-Dnieper, which provide support to ISAF operations. Lavrov and DFM Borodavkin stressed that the Kremlin sought broader language on U.S.-Russian cooperation in Afghanistan, which should not be solely focused on lethal transit. U/S Burns agreed on the need to underscore support for Afghanistan's economic development and counternarcotics efforts.

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Missile Defense

15. (C) Lavrov said a joint missile defense statement could be finalized by the summit. While "some" in Moscow thought that a de facto U.S. suspension of implementation of the radar and interception facilities in the Czech Republic and Poland was not sufficient for Russia to signal its readiness to move forward bilaterally, Lavrov suggested that others were prepared to overrule this cautious approach. For instance, a joint ballistic missile assessment was a good idea and would help revive planning for a Joint Data Exchange Center. At the same time, Lavrov reiterated warnings that a U.S. decision to move forward in Poland and the Czech Republic would lead to a rollback in Russian cooperation. Invigorated U.S. missile defense planning ("sites four, five and six") was not acceptable, he warned, in light of the "radical reductions" being contemplated beyond START. Lavrov said that Russia would have to build a mechanism into a START follow-on treaty that relieved Moscow of its treaty obligations, in the event the U.S. pursued more expansive defensive weapons systems, but said this discussion could wait until closer to the draft treaty's completion.

Bilateral Commission, Action Plan

16. (C) Lavrov stressed that there was "no problem of principle" in reaching agreement on the Joint Commission by the summit, just technical difficulties in determining how to align U.S. and Russian ministries and agencies. Lavrov said he would instruct DFM Ryabkov to reach agreement on the Joint Commission announcement, noting that correct Russian counterparts could be thrashed out later. On the Action Plan, Lavrov agreed with U/S Burns' assessment that we were close to a final text.

Meat and Poultry Restrictions

17. (C) U/S Burns underscored the importance that the U.S. attached to resolving Russian restrictions on the import of U.S. meat and poultry, which inflicted economic losses on an important domestic constituency. Noting U.S. disagreements over the basis of Russian restrictions, U/S Burns urged

immediate Russian action in lifting the H1N1-related delistings, as well as adoption of the draft presidential decree that would bring Russian sanitary and phyto-sanitary regulations in line with international standards. Lavrov said Kislyak had reported the strong U.S. concern over this set of issues, but noted that any linkage to lifting the restrictions and support for Russia's accession to the WTO was now ("unfortunately") misplaced. U/S Burns stressed that U.S. concerns were independent of Russia's decisionmaking on WTO. Lavrov was non-committal on whether Russia would take action in advance of the summit, but acknowledged the sensitivity of the issue to a domestic U.S. audience, noting that Russian actions on meat and poultry similarly had precipitated a strong backlash in Brazil. Clarifying that the MFA was not the lead on this set of issues, Lavrov concluded wryly that he was "less involved with the Russian agriculture lobby" than his U.S. counterparts.

Civil Society Event

18. (C) U/S Burns explained the goals of the proposed U.S.-Russia civil society event at the summit, urging Lavrov to encourage Medvedev's participation with the President in meeting the activists. U/S Burns clarified that the session would bring together U.S. and Russian civil society representatives for a wide-ranging discussion on challenges facing both societies. The event was not designed to single out Russia for criticism. Lavrov responded that Medvedev was not afraid of criticism of Russia, but that the Kremlin was sensitive to any optic that suggested Obama's presence in Moscow was required for Medvedev to engage with Russian civil society. Lavrov underscored several times that Medvedev had made a point of meeting with a broad range of civil society figures, including opposition political party leaders, newspaper editors, and activists.

19. (C) U/S Burns reviewed the range of groups slated to participate in the conference. Lavrov said he was unaware of the details of the proposed event, but took the point that the joint participation of U.S. and Russian activists provided a logical backdrop for both Presidents to participate in a discussion of the plenary conclusions. Lavrov asked for detailed information on the participants and structure of both the civil society and business gatherings, undertaking to brief Medvedev when he sees him on June 28 in Baku. (Note: Details on the proposed civil society forum were passed to the Russian delegation on June 26.) U/S Burns noted that the organizers were flexible with respect to the

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format of the Presidents' engagement, and underscored again that the event served to underscore Medvedev's positive disposition towards engaging with civil society.

Summit: UNSCR 1540 and Boeing Joint Venture

110. (C) Lavrov asked for clarification of whether there would be a joint presidential visit to the opening of the Boeing joint venture, and pushed for a U.S. response to his proposal in Geneva on May 7 to intensify cooperation under UNSCR 1540. U/S Burns undertook to get a formal reaction to both proposals.

DPRK: Russian Outreach to Burma

111. (C) In addition to further U.S. intelligence on the nature of the North Korean ship Kang Ram, Lavrov requested further clarification of U.S. rules of engagement in implementing UNSCR 1874, noting that Russian naval assets in close proximity made this an important issue for Moscow. Lavrov supported U.S. efforts to ensure implementation of the resolution and said Russia would send a "polite but insistent" message to Burma to uphold UNSCR 1874. Lavrov characterized Beijing as being "at a loss." While Beijing did not want to tolerate the "total disrespect" meted out by Pyongyang, neither did it want to push events into an

"uncontrollable direction." (Note: On June 25, U/S Burns conveyed further information on the status of the Kang Ram and on U.S. rules of engagement to Lavrov.)

Iran

¶12. (C) U/S Burns noted the President's efforts to balance condemnation of the Iranian government's violence against its citizens, with the need to keep the door open for diplomatic engagement to halt the Iranian nuclear program. Lavrov conceded the images out of Iran were bad. While the situation had appeared to be settling down on June 24, reports on June 25 indicated a further rise in tensions. Lavrov maintained that the Iranians had to sort this out on the basis of "rule of law, procedures, and courts," and asserted that this appeared to be the path chosen by Supreme Leader Khamenei. Lavrov blamed both government forces and elements within the opposition for provoking the crowds, but rejected Iranian accusations of outside interference. The lesson, Lavrov concluded, was that Iran's political establishment and society were not monolithic; to the contrary, the demonstrations revealed a vibrant political culture, as well as elements of a democracy.

¶13. (C) Lavrov appreciated that the President's condemnation of the violence did not constitute an end to the policy of diplomatic engagement with Tehran. Regardless of who rules Iran, he stressed, the international community will need to engage Tehran on nonproliferation, Iraq, Afghanistan, counternarcotics, and other strategically important issues. Lavrov conceded that the post-electoral resumption of P5+1 negotiations would be delayed by the domestic discord, but took strong exception to some European calls for new sanctions as early as September. Stressing that the Iranians would hold Obama to the "end of year" timeframe, Lavrov urged sensitivity to the "Iranian mentality." While the international community still had a chance - less than 50 percent, but still a better chance than a year ago - to deter Iran from a nuclear program, Lavrov insisted that the strategy would require incentives, patience, and time. U/S Burns responded that the Administration had demonstrated it was prepared to pursue serious direct diplomacy, but warned that continued stalling by Iran was unacceptable.

Corfu: European Security Treaty

¶12. (C) Pressed by U/S Burns to describe Russian objectives at Corfu, Lavrov broke no new ground in describing Russia's approach to a new European Security Treaty. Stressing the "principle of indivisible security," he argued for a "healthy debate" on how to make this principle legally binding, noting continued Russian neuralgia over NATO enlargement, the definition of "substantial combat forces," the presence of U.S. bases in Central and Eastern Europe, and missile defense. Lavrov said that Russia expected a "respectful attitude" towards Medvedev's initiative. OSCE provided for a special security forum to discuss hard security issues. This wasn't a debate about Khodorkovskiy's trial; likewise, Russia would not seek linkage between "soft" issues and U.S. missile defense plans. Lavrov urged bilateral and multilateral discussions that would produce the elements of a new security package.

MEPP

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¶13. (C) While noting Netanyahu's penchant to paint the Middle East conflict as one pitting Arabs against Iranians, Lavrov maintained that the situation was not hopeless. Lavrov pointed to public comments by Hamas that it would recognize previous agreements, and its readiness to participate in a follow-on conference to Annapolis. Nevertheless, Lavrov was pragmatic about the timing of a possible Moscow conference, noting that it required greater clarity on the ground. He welcomed the U.S. decision to

return an Ambassador to Damascus.
DIBBLE